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Abstract—We consider a class of malicious attacks against
remote state estimation. A sensor with limited resources adopts an
acknowledgement (ACK)-based online power schedule to improve
the remote state estimation performance. A malicious attacker
can modify the ACKs from the remote estimator and convey fake
information to the sensor. When the capability of the attacker
is limited, we propose an attack strategy for the attacker and
analyze the corresponding effect on the estimation performance.
The possible responses of the sensor are studied and a condition
for the sensor to discard ACKs and switch from online schedule
to offline schedule is provided.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical Systems, Security, Fake-ACK
Attack, Remote State Estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have been a hot topic among
both academic and industrial communities in the past few
years. A wide application spectrum of CPS can be found in
areas such as smart grid, intelligent transportation and environ-
ment monitoring [1] with the integration of sensing, control,
communication and computation. In most CPS infrastructures,
wireless sensors are key components with advantages such
as low cost, easy installation, self-power [2], when compared
with traditional wired sensors. Therefore, wireless sensors
have been increasingly equipped in CPS to replace wired
sensors. The new issues due to their special characteristics
have attracted much attention in recent years.
The first issue is how to allocate the energy of the sensor
efficiently. Since most wireless sensors use on-board batteries
which are difficult to replace, and are typically expected to
work for several years without battery replacement, energy
conservation is critical [3]–[5]. In [6], the authors consider
the sensor scheduling problem of whether it should send
its data to a remote estimator or not due to the limited
available communication energy. The optimal offline sensor
schedule is derived, where the term “offline” means that the
sensor designs its strategy before the process starting, i.e.,
independent of the state of the process. In [7]–[9], the authors
extend the result in [6] and propose a so-called “online” sensor
power schedules by utilizing the real-time information of the
process. One typical category of online information is the ACK
from the remote estimator, indicating whether the data packet
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from the sensor arrives successfully or not. The ACK-based
online power schedule is proved to improve the estimation
performance significantly [8] compared to the offline schedule
which only requires sending a 1-bit ACK packet.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of Cyber-Physical Systems.
However, as the communication is through a wireless
channel, these sensors are more vulnerable to cyber security
threats. In some safety-critical infrastructures, the wide use
of CPS enlarges the risks and severities of such attacks.
For example, as the largest and most complex CPS in the
future, any severe attack on smart grid may have significant
impacts on national economy and security or even loss of
human life [10]. Therefore, the security issue is of fundamental
importance to ensure the safe operation of CPS. There are
two possible types of attacks that are commonly investigated
in the literature: deception (integrity) attacks and denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks [11], corresponding to the two traditional
security goals integrity and availability. The integrity attacks
on CPS focus on the integrity of data by modifying the data
packet [12], [13], while the DoS attacks block the exchange of
information including sensor measurements or control inputs
between each part of CPS [14], [15]. In practice, the integrity
attacks studied in [12], [13], [16] often require comprehensive
information about the system and modifications of the data.
Such information is not needed in DoS attacks. In this work,
we will consider both types of attacks.
Though the online power schedule in [8] improves the
estimation performance, the simple structure of the ACK
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2packet makes it a more reachable (and likely) alternative for
the adversary, under both integrity attacks and DoS attacks.
Elucidating what is the possible attack patterns are and how
they will affect the estimation performance are important to
help us improve the design of CPS. This motivates us to
investigate such potential class of malicious attacks against
ACK-based remote state estimation.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system framework and states the main problem
of interest. Section III provides some preliminaries about the
optimal offline schedule and an online schedule. The analysis
of our proposed fake-ACK attack pattern is given in Section
IV. Numerical examples and simulations are demonstrated in
Section V. Section VI provides some concluding remarks.
Notations: Z denotes the set of all integers and N the
positive integers. R is the set of real numbers. Rn is the
n-dimensional Euclidean space. Sn+ (and Sn++) is the set of
n by n positive semi-definite matrices (and positive definite
matrices). When X ∈ Sn+ (and Sn++), we write X > 0 (and
X > 0) and X > Y if X − Y ∈ Sn+. The curled inequality
symbols  and  (and their strict forms  and ≺) are used
to denote generalized componentwise inequalities between
vectors: for vectors a = [a1, a2, ..., an]′,b = [b1, b2, ..., bn]′,
we write a  b if ai > bi, for i = 1, 2, ..., n. 1 denotes
vector with all entries one. Tr(·) is the trace of a matrix.
The superscript ′ stands for transposition. For functions g, h
with appropriate domains, g ◦ h(x) stands for the function
composition g
(
h(x)
)
, and hn(x) , h
(
hn−1(x)
)
, where n ∈ N
and with h0(x) , x. δij is the Dirac delta function, i.e., δij
equals to 1 when i = j, and 0 otherwise. The notation P[·]
refers to probability and E[·] to expectation.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A. System Model
Our interest lies in the security of a remote state estimation
as depicted in Fig. 2. Here we consider a general discrete-time
linear time-invariant (LTI) process of the form:
xk+1 = Axk + wk, (1)
yk = Cxk + vk, (2)
where k ∈ N, xk ∈ Rnx is the process state vector at
time k, yk ∈ Rny is the measurement taken by the sensor,
wk ∈ Rnx and vk ∈ Rny are zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian noises
with E[wkw′j ] = δkjQ (Q > 0), E[vkvj ′] = δkjR (R > 0),
E[wkvj ′] = 0 ∀j, k ∈ N. The initial state x0 is a zero-
mean Gaussian random vector uncorrelated with wk and vk
with covariance Π0 > 0. The pair (A,C) is assumed to be
observable and (A,Q1/2) is controllable.
We consider the so-called “smart sensor” as described
in [17], which first locally estimates the state xk based on
all the measurements it has collected up to time k and then
transmits its local estimate to the remote estimator.
Denote xˆsk and P
s
k as the sensor’s local minimum mean-
squared error (MMSE) estimate of the state xk and the
Fig. 2. System Architecture.
corresponding error covariance:
xˆsk = E[xk|y1, y2, ..., yk], (3)
Pˆ sk = E[(xk − xˆsk)(xk − xˆsk)′|y1, y2, ..., yk], (4)
which can be calculated by a standard Kalman filter.
As the estimation error covariance of the Kalman filter
converges to a unique value from any initial condition ([18]),
without loss of generality, we assume that the Kalman filter at
the sensor side has entered the steady state and simplify our
subsequent discussion by setting:
P sk = P , k > 1, (5)
where P is the steady-state error covariance. For notational
ease, we define the Lyapunov and Riccati operators h, g˜ :
Sn+ → Sn+ as:
h(X) , AXA′ +Q,
g˜(X) , X −XC ′[CXC ′ +R]−1CX.
Then P is given by the unique positive semi-definite solution
of g˜ ◦ h(X) = X (see [18]).
The error covariance P has the following property:
Lemma 2.1: (Lemma 2.3 in [19]) For 0 6 t1 6 t2, the
following inequality holds:
ht1(P ) 6 ht2(P ). (6)
In addition, if t1 < t2, then
Tr
(
ht1(P )
)
< Tr
(
ht2(P )
)
. (7)
After obtaining xˆsk, the sensor will transmit it as a data
packet to the remote estimator. Due to fading and interference,
random data drops will occur. As modelled in [6], [8], we
assume that the sensor has two transmission power levels:
when using a higher energy ∆, the packet will always arrive
to the remote estimator; when using a lower energy δ, the
successful arrival rate is λ ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the following
discussion, we denote the sensor power schedule as:
θ = {γ1, γ2, ..., γk, ...}, (8)
where γk = 1 or 0 represents that the sensor chooses energy
∆ or δ, respectively, at time step k.
3B. Remote State Estimation
The transmission of xˆsk between the sensor and the re-
mote estimator can be characterized by a binary random
process {λk}, k ∈ N:
λk =
{
1, if xˆsk arrives at time k,
0, otherwise (regarded as dropout).
Denote xˆk and Pk as the remote estimator’s own MMSE state
estimate and the corresponding error covariance based on all
the sensor data packets received up to time step k. From [20]
and [21], the remote state estimate xˆk obeys the recursion:
xˆk =
{
xˆsk, if λk = 1,
Axˆk−1, if λk = 0.
(9)
The corresponding state estimation error covariance Pk satis-
fies:
Pk =
{
P , if λk = 1,
h(Pk−1), if λk = 0.
(10)
Intuitively, higher transmission power leads to better es-
timation performance. However, in practice, the sensor has
a limited energy budget, which motivates us to consider the
following optimization problem:
Problem 2.2:
min
θ
J(θ) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
Tr (E[Pk]) ,
s.t. Φ(θ) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
E [γk∆ + (1− γk)δ] 6 Ψ,
where Ψ is the average energy constraint for the sensor.
Remark 2.3: We assume that ∆, δ, and Ψ are all positive
rational numbers satisfying δ < Ψ < ∆. 
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will revise some preliminary results about
the optimal offline schedule and an ACK-based online power
schedule when there is no attacker.
A. Optimal Offline Schedule
When the sensor designs its power schedule without utiliz-
ing any online information, the optimal solution is provided
by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 (Optimal Offline Schedule Proposed in [6]):
Given the average energy constraint Ψ, suppose that p and
q are two co-prime integers satisfying pq =
Ψ−δ
∆−δ . Then the
optimal offline power schedule θ?off to Problem 2.2 over a
period q can be constructed in the following form:
(1 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s0+1 times
) · · · (1 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s0+1times
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
(1 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s0 times
) · · · (1 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s0times
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
where 1 and 0 denotes the designed value for γk in (8), m =
q− p(s0 + 1), n = p(s0 + 2)− q, and s0 is the largest integer
such that s0 6 qp − 1. 
Under the optimal offline schedule θ?off, we have the fol-
lowing closed-form results about the corresponding energy
consumption and estimation performance [6].
Proposition 3.2: When θ?off is used, the average energy cost
is given by
Φ(θ?off) =
(m+ n)∆ + (ms0 + ns0 +m)δ
ms0 + ns0 + 2m+ n
= Ψ,
and the trace of the expected average state estimation error
covariance is given by:
J(θ?off) =
1
m(s0 + 2) + n(s0 + 1)
·
Tr
{
m
[
1 + λ(s0 + 1)]P + n
[
1 + λs0)]P
+m
s0+1∑
i=1
[
1 + λ(s0 + 1− i)
]
(1− λ)ihi(P )
+ n
s0∑
i=1
[
1 + λ(s0 − i)
]
(1− λ)ihi(P )
}
.

B. Online Power Schedule
The offline power schedules are designed before the system
is running without using the realtime measurement or state
information. In [9], the author showed that the utilization of
the online information can improve the system performance
while require less energy consumption. To further improve
the estimation performance, an online power schedule based
on the ACKs from the remote estimator was proposed in [8]
as follows: the remote estimator generates 1-bit ACKs (= λk)
to indicate whether the data packet arrives successfully or not
and an event-detector at the remote estimator’s side collects
and stores the ACKs in an L-bit memory. Without loss of
generality, assume the sensor uses ∆ at the first time step. The
memory is set to 11, ..., 11 initially and the detector randomly
chooses to activate z0-bit memory (z0 < L) with probability
µ, or (z0 + 1)-bit memory otherwise. At every time step, the
memory shifts all bits one bit to the MSB direction with the
existing MSB being deleted and the incoming ACK stored in
the LSB. When the memory becomes 00, ..., 00, the detector
sends a flag-ACK to inform the sensor to use high power in
the following time step. In the meanwhile, the memory is set
to 11, ..., 11 again (see Fig. 3).
By properly designing the parameter z0 and µ, the average
energy consumption can meet the constraint in Problem 2.2
and the corresponding estimation performance is given by the
following theorem:
Theorem 3.3 (Theorem 4.5 in [8]): Under the proposed
online power schedule θon, the trace of the average expected
estimation error covariance is given by:
J(θon) =
λ
1− µ(1− λ)z0+1 − µ(1− λ)z0+2 ·
Tr
[ z0∑
i=0
(1− λ)ihi(P ) + µ(1− λ)z0+1hz0+1(P )
]
.
4Fig. 3. System Architecture under Online Sensor Schedule.

Compared to the optimal offline schedule, the proposed
online schedule θon has a better estimation performance under
the same energy constraint, which is summarized in the
following theorem [8]:
Theorem 3.4 (Theorem 5.3 in [8]): Under the same energy
constraint as in Problem 2.2, the proposed online schedule θon
has a better estimation performance than the optimal offline
schedule θ?off provided in Theorem 3.1, i.e.,
J(θon) < J(θ
?
off).
IV. FAKE-ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ATTACK AGAINST
REMOTE ESTIMATION
As stated before, the ACK-based online power schedule can
improve the estimation performance significantly compared to
the offline schedule. However, the simple structure of the 1-
bit flag-ACK packet makes it a more reachable (and likely)
alternative for the adversary, under both integrity attacks and
DoS attacks. In this section, we propose a possible attack
pattern for the attacker and investigate the corresponding effect
on the estimation performance.
A. Proposed Fake-ACK Attack Pattern
Based on the communication protocol used by the event-
detector, the attacker may adopt different types of attacks:
when the flag-ACK is sent at every time step with value 1
or 0 (Type A), the attacker modifies the bit contained in the
packet to launch the attack, i.e., the integrity attack; when
the flag-ACK is sent only when the event happens (Type
B), the attacker can simply adopt DoS attack to prevent
the transmission of the packet. No matter what types of the
communication protocols and attacks are used, the consequent
results are the same: the time steps which would use energy
∆ now use δ instead under the attack. Therefore, without loss
of generality, we will assume that the event-detector adopts
protocol Type B and the attacker launches DoS attack in the
following discussion (the analysis of the other case is almost
the same).
Assume that the attacker also has an energy constraint
and cannot launch attack at every time step. Otherwise, it
is straightforward to see that the attacker will attack all the
flag-ACKs with value 1 to prevent the transmission. Let the
proportion of the flag-ACK packets that can be prevented by
the attacker among all the flag-ACK packets be constrained
to be β ∈ (0, 1) and t, r(t > r) are two co-prime integers
satisfying rt = β. In [15], the optimal DoS attack pattern
is proved to be launching the attack consecutively so that
the effect on the estimation performance is maximized. This
motivates us to consider the specific attack pattern of interest
described as follows:
1) the attacker follows a periodic pattern;
2) the attacker maintains a counter and launches DoS
attacks to prevent the transmission of the first r coming
flag-ACKs, and leave the rest t − r coming flag-ACK
with value 1 unchanged;
3) after every t coming flag-ACKs, the counter is set to 0
again.
This is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Attacking Pattern for The Attacker
1: Process begins;
2: counter = 0;
3: while 1 do
4: if a flag-ACK packet is sent then
5: if counter 6 r then
6: block the transmission of the flag-ACK packet;
7: else
8: do not block;
9: end if
10: counter = counter + 1;
11: end if
12: if counter == t then
13: counter = 0;
14: end if
15: end while
Example 4.1: We use a simple example to illustrate how
this attack pattern works. Assume that z0 = 2, β = 23 (thus
r = 2 and t = 3), one possible realization and comparison
between the online schedule θon and the one under attack θ˜on
are shown in Fig. 4 (the long arrows represent the arrival
packets while the short one is for the dropped packets; the
number between arrows is the value of the counter). In the
realization of θon without attack, the second and the third flag-
ACK are sent due to two (z0 = 2) consecutive packet losses.
When there is an attacker following the pattern in Algorithm 1,
it will attack the first two (r = 2) flag-ACKs, let the third one
transmitted, and reset the counter for a new period.
B. Performance Analysis
Denote the estimation performance of θon under the pro-
posed fake-ACK attack as J(θ˜on). We will investigate the
analytical form of J(θ˜on) in the following part.
Note that due to the recursion of the dynamics in (10), the
covariance Pk can only take value in the infinitely countable
set {P , h(P ), h2(P ), ...}. Denote τk ∈ Z as the holding
5Fig. 4. Comparison between θon and θ˜on
time since the most recent time when the remote estimator
successfully received the data from sensor:
τk , k − max
16t6k
{t : λt = 1}. (11)
Then we have
Pk =
{
P , if λk = 1,
hτk(P ), if λk = 0.
Define the value of the attacker’s counter at time step k as
σk ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., t − 1} and the state of the process at time
step k as:
Sk = (τk, σk).
As the strategy of the attacker guarantees that the flag-ACK
will be sent to the sensor when the value of the counter is
larger than r, the covariance Pk will be bounded and τk only
takes value in a finite set. Therefore, based on the recursion
in (10), it is easy to verify that the process {Sk} constitutes
a finite state stationary Markov chain.
Remark 4.2: Note that the design of the parameter µ in the
online sensor schedule θon is to tune the activated memory
length between z0 and z0 + 1 in the event-detector to satisfy
the energy constraint. When the energy constraint is in some
simple form, e.g., 12 or
1
3 , a fixed length activated memory
with z0 is sufficient. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the event-detector adopts a fixed activated memory with
length z0 to facilitate the discussion and simplify the notation
below. We will later show that our results also apply to the
general case with variant length. 
According to the mechanism of the online sensor schedule
θon and the attack strategy, τk only takes values in the
set {0, 1, 2, ..., z0(σk + 1)} when σk 6 r and in the set
{0, 1, 2, ..., z0} when r < σk < t. Then the state set can be
constructed as:
S ,
{
(0, 0), (1, 0), .., (z0 − 1, 0), (z0, 0),
(0, 1), (1, 1), ..., (2z0 − 1, 1), (2z0, 1),
...
(0, r), (1, r), ...,
(
z0(r + 1)− 1, r
)
,
(
z0(r + 1), r
)
,
(0, r + 1), (1, r + 1), .., (z0 − 1, r + 1), (z0, r + 1),
(0, r + 2), (1, r + 2), .., (z0 − 1, r + 2), (z0, r + 2),
...
(0, t− 1), (1, t− 1), .., (z0 − 1, t− 1), (z0, t− 1)
}
.
The total number of states can be calculated as:
|S| =
r∑
i=0
[
z0(i+ 1) + 1
]
+
[
(t− 1)− (r + 1) + 1](z0 + 1)
=
1
2
r(r + 1)z0 + t(z0 + 1).
It is convenient to label each state i in S in a sequential
order from i = 1 to |S|. Then we can define the state transition
probability matrix as:
Ts = {Tij}|S|×|S|,
where
Tij , P[Sk+1 = j |Sk = i].
Based on the mechanism of the online sensor schedule θon
and the attack strategy, we can derive the transition probability
from Sk+1 = (τk+1, σk) to Sk = (τk, σk) as follows:
1) when τk mod z0 6= 0 or τk = 0, the event detector
will not send the flag-ACK (and no attack as a consequence).
Thus:
P
[
Sk+1|Sk
]
=

λ, if (τk+1, σk+1) = (0, σk),
1− λ, if (τk+1, σk+1) = (τk + 1, σk),
0, otherwise;
2) when τk mod z0 = 0, τk 6= 0 and σk < r, the memory
satisfies the triggering condition, the flag-ACK will be sent
and the attack will be launched with the counter increasing by
1. Thus:
P
[
Sk+1|Sk
]
=

λ, if (τk+1, σk+1) = (0, σk + 1),
1− λ, if (τk+1, σk+1) = (τk + 1, σk + 1),
0, otherwise;
3) when τk mod z0 = 0, τk 6= 0 and r 6 σk < t− 1, the
memory satisfies the triggering condition, the flag-ACK will
be sent without being attacked and the counter increasing by
1. Thus:
P
[
Sk+1|Sk
]
=
{
1, if (τk+1, σk+1) = (0, σk + 1),
0, otherwise;
4) when τk mod z0 = 0, τk 6= 0 and σk = t − 1, the
memory satisfies the triggering condition, the flag-ACK will
be sent without being attacked and the counter is reset to 0.
Thus:
P
[
Sk+1|Sk
]
=
{
1, if (τk+1, σk+1) = (0, 0),
0, otherwise.
6Based on the above discussion, we can obtain the expression
of the transition matrix Ts. Due to space limitation, we provide
a simple example of Ts when z0 = 2, r = 1 and t = 3
(therefore |S| = 11) in (12).
Based on the well-established ergodic Markov chain the-
ory [22], {Sk} has a stationary probability distribution of
states, which is denoted as:
Π =
[
P[1],P[2], ...,P[|S|]
]′
,
When {Sk} enters the steady state, we have{
TsΠ = Π,∑|S|
i=1 Π(i) = 1,
(13)
where Π(i) is the i-th element of Π.
By solving (13), we can obtain the stationary distribution
of state, denoted as Π?. Then we can calculate the estimation
performance of θon under the proposed fake-ACK attack as
follows:
J(θ˜on) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
Tr (E[Pk])
= lim sup
k→∞
Tr (E[Pk])
=
|S|∑
i=1
Π?(i)Tr
(
E
[
Pk(i)
])
.
C. Discussion
To analyze the effect of the proposed attacking pattern on
θon, we first consider two extreme cases.
When the energy constraint for the attacker is β = 1, the
attacker can block the transmissions of all the flag-ACKs,
resulting in the sensor using the low power δ within the entire
time-horizon. The corresponding estimation performance can
be calculated as:
J(θ˜on)max = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
Tr (E[Pk])
= lim sup
k→∞
Tr (E[Pk])
=
+∞∑
i=0
λ(1− λ)iTr(hi(P )).
Note that the necessary and sufficient condition for the stability
of the above case is simply given by ρ(A)(1− λ) < 1, where
ρ(A) is the maximum eigenvalue of A. Since, as proved in [20]
and [6], more energy budget is always beneficial, we have:
J(θ˜on)max = J(θ
?
off)(n=0) > J(θ?off), (14)
where n is the number of high energy δ that can be used
within each period of J(θ?off) defined in Theorem 3.1.
One the other hand, when β = 0, the attacker cannot block
any flag-ACK and the online sensor schedule will operate
normally. Therefore, we have:
J(θ˜on)min = J(θon). (15)
Combining (14) and (15), we have:
J(θon) = J(θ˜on)min 6 J(θ?off) 6 J(θ˜on)max.
As a consequence, when the capability of the attacker is
limited, keeping the online schedule will still guarantee a
better performance than the offline schedule θ?off. Otherwise,
when the attacker has sufficient energy budget, the estimation
performance under the online sensor schedule θon, J(θ˜on), will
be even worse than the offline schedule θ?off. In such case, not
using ACK is preferable to using fake ACK and the reasonable
choice for the sensor is to adopt the offline schedule rather than
keeping the online schedule. Furthermore, as the performance
metric J(θ˜on) is growing with the energy budget β, there exists
a threshold value β such that (as later shown in Fig. 6):
J(θ˜on)β=β = J(θ
?
off).
Hence, in practice, based on the information about the at-
tacker’s capability, the sensor can choose different types of
schedules to obtain a better performance, i.e.,
θ˜on =
{
θon, when β < β,
θ?off, when β > β,
where β can be calculated numerically. How to obtain the
value of β analytically is an interesting problem which will
be considered in our future work.
Remark 4.3: Note that the sensor can detect the existence of
the attacker by checking the arrival rate of flag-ACKs based on
the theoretical arrival rate provided in [8]. The observation will
enable the sensor to estimate the capability of the attacker. On
the other hand, when the sensor is aware of the existence of the
attacker, the attacker will also need to re-design his strategy to
avoid being detected, which will result in a dynamic decision-
making process between both sides. We will investigate this
problem under a game-theoretic framework in the future. 
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate
our results in different situations.
Define
Jk(θ) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Tr (E[Pi]) ,
as the empirical approximation (via 100000 Monte Carlo
simulations) of J(θ) at every time instant k.
Consider a scalar system with parameters A = 1.2, C = 0.7,
R = Q = 0.8, λ = 0.5. Suppose that the energy constraint
for the sensor is given by Ψ = 17∆ +
6
7δ. It is easy to verify
that the optimal offline schedule is given in a periodic form of
{1000000, 1000000, ...} with performance J(θ?off) = 2.0953.
The parameter for the online schedule is z0 = 2 with
performance J(θon) = 1.6399. As shown in Fig. 5, when the
energy constraint for the attacker is β = 15 , the estimation
performance J(θ˜on) is better than the performance using the
offline schedule θ?off (thus the sensor may still choose θon).
However, when the energy budget for the attacker is further
increased, e.g., β = 23 , J(θ˜on) is worse even than the offline
θ?off (thus the sensor may switch from the online schedule to the
7Ts =

λ λ λ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1− λ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1− λ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 λ λ 0 λ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1− λ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1− λ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1− λ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1− λ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 λ λ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1− λ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1− λ 0

(12)
offline one to obtain better estimation performance). In Fig. 6,
the comparison of J(θ˜on) as a function of β is provided. As
we can see, the approximate value of β is about 0.28.
Fig. 5. Comparison between J(θ?off), J(θon) and J(θ˜on).
Fig. 6. Comparison of J(θ˜on) under different β.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, a potential class of malicious attacks against
remote state estimation was studied. We proposed a strategy
for the attacker which can modify the flag-ACKs from the
remote estimator and convey fake information to the sensor.
The corresponding effect on the estimation performance is
analyzed based on well-established Markov chain theory. The
condition for the sensor to use an online schedule instead of
an offline schedule is provided. Simulations were provided
to illustrate our results. Future works include obtaining the
threshold value of β analytically, considering other types of
fake-ACK attacks and extending the problem into a game-
theoretic framework where the attacker need to design their
pattern without being detected.
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